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Abstract
Collective intelligence is the ability of a group to perform more effectively than any in-
dividual alone. Diversity among group members is a key condition for the emergence of
collective intelligence, but maintaining diversity is challenging in the face of social pressure
to imitate one’s peers. We investigate the role incentives play in maintaining useful diver-
sity through an evolutionary game-theoretic model of collective prediction. We show that
market-based incentive systems produce herding effects, reduce information available to the
group and suppress collective intelligence. In response, we propose a new incentive scheme
that rewards accurate minority predictions, and show that this produces optimal diversity
and collective predictive accuracy. We conclude that real-world systems should reward those
who have demonstrated accuracy when majority opinion has been in error.
The financial crisis and its aftermath have reopened long-standing debates about the col-
lective wisdom of our societal organisations [1, 2, 3]. Financial and prediction markets seem
unable to foresee major economic and political upheavals such as the credit crunch, Brexit and
the American presidential election. This lack of collective foresight might be the result of in-
sufficient diversity among decision-making individuals [4]. Diversity is a crucial condition for
collective intelligence [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] that can be more important than the intelligence of individ-
uals within a group [10]. As collective intelligence ultimately results from individual actions, it
depends on how individuals are incentivised [11, 12]. While most previous research has focused
on explaining how the phenomena of collective intelligence emerge [13], less is known about how
to optimise collective wisdom in a quantitative sense.
Harnessing collective wisdom is important. Global systems of communication, governance,
trade and transport grow rapidly in complexity every year. As a result it becomes impossi-
ble for any single individual or agency to gather and process enough data to understand the
entire system [14]. Attention is therefore shifting towards decentralised systems as a means
to bring together the local knowledge and private expertise of many individuals [15, 11]. In
machine-learning, researchers have found that diverse ensembles of models maximise prediction
accuracy [16]. In politics, the forecasts of prediction markets [17, 18] are now commonly re-
ported alongside opinion polls during elections. Scientists are also turning to crowd-sourcing
collective wisdom as a validation tool [19, 20, 21]. However, as highlighted by the inability of
financial and prediction markets to foresee the results of recent elections in the UK and USA,
collective wisdom is not a guaranteed property of a distributed system [2], in part due to herding
effects [22, 23]. In science as well, the incentive structure undervalues diversity: low-risk projects
with assured outcomes are more likely to be funded than highly novel or interdisciplinary work
[24, 25]. Rewards for conformity with institutional cultures can severely limit useful diversity
as well [26]. Previous work [27] has investigated mechanisms to elicit truthful, existing minority
views to counter herding effects in expressed opinion. This raises the question: how can minor-
ity viewpoints be fostered in the first place, so as to enhance diversity and its potential benefits
for collective intelligence?
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Here we analyse an evolutionary game-theoretic model of collective intelligence amongst
unrelated agents motivated by individual reward. We show that previously proposed incentive
structures [12] are sub-optimal from the standpoint of collective intelligence, and in particular
produce too little diversity between individuals. We propose a new incentive system we term
‘minority rewards’, wherein agents are rewarded for expressing accurate minority opinions,
and show that this produces stable, near-optimal collective intelligence at equilibrium. Our
results demonstrate that existing real-world reward structures are unlikely to produce optimal
collectively intelligent behaviour, and we present a superior alternative that should motivate
new reward systems.
Results
To investigate the effect of incentives on collective intelligence, we use an abstract model of
collective information gathering and aggregation [12]. Complex outcomes are modelled as a
result of n independent, causal factors. A large population of individual agents gather infor-
mation in a decentralised fashion, each being able to pay attention to just one of these factors
at any given time. Collective prediction is achieved by aggregation of individual predictions
via simple voting. Agents are motivated to seek information and to provide predictions by
incentive schemes that offer rewards for making accurate predictions. It is assumed that the
accuracy of an individual’s prediction can be judged after the event. We exclude cases where
the ground truth is either never discoverable or where no such ground truth exists (for instance
in questions regarding taste or voter preferences), but instead consider questions such as predic-
tions of future events (which are known once they occur) or scientific questions (which may be
resolved at some later time). To illustrate with concrete examples, one might consider whether
national GDP will rise above trend in the coming year, whether a given company will increase
its profits, or whether global temperatures will increase by more than 1◦C in the next decade.
The proportion of agents attending to different sources of information evolve depending on the
rewards they receive, where less successful agents tend to imitate their more successful peers.
Consider a binary outcome, Y , which is the result of many factors, x1, x2, . . . , xn. We model
this outcome as the sign of a weighted sum of the contributing factors:
Y = sign
(
n∑
i=1
βixi
)
. (1)
Each contributing factor takes binary values, such that Y, xi ∈ {−1, 1}. We assume that the
values of these factors are uncorrelated (see Supplementary Information for instances where this
assumption may be relaxed). Without loss of generality we assume that βi > 0 for all factors.
An individual attending to factor i observes the value of xi. Having observed the value of xi,
this individual then votes in line with that observation. Thus, if the proportion of individuals
attending to factor i is ρi, the collective prediction, Yˆ is given by:
Yˆ = sign
(
n∑
i=1
ρixi
)
. (2)
Collective accuracy, C, is the probability that the collective vote agrees with the ground truth,
given the distribution, {ρ}, of agents attending to each factor:
C = P
(
Yˆ = Y | {ρ}
)
. (3)
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The reward given to an agent for an accurate vote depends on the proportion of other correct
votes in any given collective decision. We denote as zi the proportion of agents that will vote
identically to those attending to factor i, that is the proportion of agents attending to factors
whose value matches xi: zi =
∑n
j=1 ρjδxi,xj , where δ is the Kronecker delta. The reward is
determined by a function, f(zi), such that an agent receives a reward proportional to f(zi)
if and only if their prediction is accurate. We will investigate three potential reward systems
for deciding how each agent is rewarded for their accurate votes, the first two of which are
taken from previous work by Hong et al. [12]. The first of these is ‘binary rewards’: agents
receive a fixed reward if they make an accurate prediction, corresponding to the reward function
f(zi) = 1. The second is ‘market rewards’: a fixed total reward is shared equally amongst all
agents who vote accurately, corresponding to the reward function f(zi) = 1/zi. This adds
an incentive to be accurate when others are not, and closely mimics the reward system of
actual prediction markets. Finally we introduce ‘minority rewards’: agents are rewarded for an
accurate prediction when fewer than half of the other agents also vote accurately, corresponding
to the reward function f(zi) = 1−H(zi−1/2), where H(·) is the Heavyside step function. This
explicitly rewards agents who hold accurate minority opinions, and incentivises agents to be
accurate on questions where the aggregate prediction is wrong.
The expected reward a player receives by attending to factor i is determined by the expected
value of f(zi), conditioned on voting accurately (Methods, equation 8).Players adapt their
behaviour in response to the rewards they and others receive. In alignment with previous
evolutionary game theory work, we model changes in individual attention to factors as being
the result of imitation; agents who are observed to be gaining greater rewards are imitated by
those gaining fewer. This leads to the classic replicator equation [28], describing the evolution
of the proportion of agents, ρi, that pay attention to factor i (Methods, equation 6)
We studied the behaviour of the model under the three incentive schemes described above.
We initialised the model by assigning uniform proportions of agents to each factor, with values
of β randomly drawn from a uniform distribution (the absolute scale of β does not affect the
model). We followed the evolutionary dynamics described by the replicator equation until the
population converged to equilibrium. This was repeated over a range of problem dimensionalities
from n = 3 to n = 10000. Expected rewards were calculated either by exhaustive search
over all possible values of x1, . . . , xn (for n < 10) or by using appropriate normal-distribution
limits for large numbers of factors (see Methods). Figure 1 shows how collective accuracy
and diversity evolve towards equilibrium for the three rewards systems of binary, market and
minority rewards in simulations with n = 100, n = 1000 and n = 10, 000 independent factors.
Note the logarithmic scale on the x-axis, to better illustrate the early evolution. For each reward
system two initial allocations of agents’ attention are used: (i) a uniform allocation to each factor
; and (ii) an allocation where half of all agents attend to the single most important factor, with
others allocated uniformly across the other factors. This demonstrates that the equilibrium
distribution of attention is the same whether agents initially attend to arbitrary factors or
initially favour the most obvious ones. The exact time scale of convergence to equilibriums
depends on the magnitude of rewards; in our simulations we normalise rewards such that the
mean reward per agent is one at each time step.
Figure 2 shows how the resulting collective accuracy varies across problem dimensionalities
from n = 3 to n = 10000 for the three different reward systems and for a uniform allocation
of agents to factors. Consistent with [12], we find that market rewards increase diversity and
collective accuracy relative to binary rewards. However, collective accuracy under market re-
wards declines rapidly with increasing n, falling to ∼ 65% for n = 10000. For comparison we
also show the accuracy achieved under a uniform allocation of agents, which reaches a stable
value of approximately 80% for large n. Market rewards therefore produce lower accuracy than
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a uniform allocation for all but the lowest values of n. In contrast, minority rewards lead to a
far higher accuracy than any of the investigated alternative reward systems regardless of system
complexity, and achieve close to 100% accuracy up to n = 10000. Our mathematical analysis
shows that minority rewards will continue to produce near-perfect accuracy for any problem
size, as long as the population of agents remains large relative to the number of factors (see
Supplementary Information).
The different levels of collective accuracy across reward systems are a reflection of the differ-
ing equilibrium distributions of the proportion of agents attending to each factor. The minority
rewards scheme outperforms both market rewards and uniform, unweighted approaches, as it
automatically redirects attention if the aggregate prediction would otherwise be wrong. Un-
der minority rewards the system converges towards a state where the number of agents paying
attention to any factor is proportional to its importance. This optimal distribution is both a
stationary and stable state of the minority rewards system (see Supplementary Information).
In Figure 3 we plot the equilibrium distribution for each reward system for a high-dimensional
problem (n = 10000). Using binary rewards, almost all agents attend to the single most impor-
tant factor. Under market rewards agents distribute themselves in proportion to the predictive
value of the factors, but only amongst the top 10% of factors; 90% of factors receive essentially
no attention at all. By comparison, under minority rewards the proportion of agents paying
attention to a factor is also proportional to its importance, but agents cover the full range of
factors down to the least important, providing more information to the group and improving
predictions.
Discussion
We constructed a novel reward system, minority rewards, that incentivises individual agents in
their choice of which informational factors to attend to when operating as part of a group. This
new system rewards agents both for making accurate predictions and for being in the minority of
their peers or conspecifics. As such it encourages a balance between seeking useful information
that has substantive predictive value for the ground truth, and seeking information that is
currently under utilised by the group. We evaluated the accuracy of collective prediction within
our model resulting from our new reward scheme against both previously proposed market-like
reward mechanisms and the maximally diverse, uniform allocation of agents attention. Our
results and analysis show that minority rewards induces optimal collective intelligence, while
market rewards have lower performance that deteriorates with group size.
The poor performance of market rewards relative to a uniform unweighted allocation for
n > 10 shows that a market reward system incentivises herding behaviour and suppresses useful
diversity, as illustrated by the equilibrium distribution in Figure 3b. This suggests that stock
markets and prediction markets may systematically underweight a large pool of informational
factors that are of limited predictive power individually, but which can contribute powerfully to
aggregate predictions if agents can be persuaded to pay attention to them. This sheds doubt on
the accuracy of existing markets as a tool for aggregating dispersed knowledge to predict future
profits or events, and motivates further work on designing collectively more accurate market
mechanisms. The relatively high performance of uniform allocations of attention supports work
showing that linear models with equally weighted predictors can match or even improve on
more closely fitted prediction models [29, 30]. Inclusion of all relevant predictors is often more
important than determining their appropriate weights in making predictions; too much diversity
is less harmful than too little, especially for complex problems.
Incentives are a fundamental part of any effort to harness the potential of collective intel-
ligence. In this paper we have presented evidence that rewarding accurate minority opinions
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induces near-optimal collective accuracy. Therefore, to maximise the collective wisdom of a
group, we suggest that individuals should not be rewarded simply for having made successful
predictions or findings, nor should a total reward be equally distributed amongst those who
have been successful or accurate. Instead, rewards should be primarily oriented towards those
who have made successful predictions in the face of majority opposition from their peers, i.e.
towards those who tell us something we don’t already know. Future work should investigate
how such a reward system could be implemented in practice, to improve career progression,
funding and reputation systems [31], prediction markets, and democratic procedures [32]. In
conclusion, therefore, how best to foster collective intelligence is an important problem we need
to solve collectively.
Methods and Materials
Terminology
Throughout this paper we use the following conventions for describing probability distributions:
• E(x) denotes the expectation of x
• N (x;µ, σ2) denotes the normal probability density function with mean µ and variance σ2,
evaluated at x
• N (x;µ,Σ) for vector-valued x and mu, and matrix Σ denotes the multi-variate normal
probability density function with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ, evaluated at x
• Φ(x) denotes the standard normal cumulative probability distribution function with mean
0 and standard deviation 1.
Ground truth and voting
We consider a binary outcome, Y that is the result of many independent factors, x1, x2, . . . , xn.
We model this outcome as being determined by the sign of ψ: a weighted sum of the contributing
factors. To facilitate further analysis we introduce the latent variable ψ, which is the simple
sum of the contributions from each factor.
Y = sign(ψ), ψ =
n∑
i=1
βixi. (4)
In computational implementation of this model we sample values of {β} independently from a
uniform distribution (the scale of which is arbitrary and does not influence the analysis). We
assume without loss of generality that factors are ordered such that βi ≥ βi+1, and further we
normalise the values of the coefficients such that
∑n
i=1 βi = 1, without affecting the value of
Y . Our analytical results below do not depend on the exact distributon of {β}. Any sampling
distribution for {β} that has a finite moment of order m, m > 2 will obey the Ljapunov and Lin-
deberg conditions [33], guaranteeing convergence in distribution of ψ to a normal distribution,
from which our results are obtained.
Each individual attends to one factor at a given time; an individual attending to factor i
therefore observes the value of xi. Having observed the value of xi this individual then votes
in line with that observation. The collective prediction, Yˆ is given by the sign of the collective
vote V , which is a sum over the contributing factors, weighted by the proportion of individuals
attending to each factor:
Yˆ = sign(V ), V =
n∑
i=1
ρixi. (5)
5
Evolutionary dynamics
We model changes in individual attention to factors as being motivated by imitation individuals;
agents who are observed to be gaining greater rewards are imitated by those gaining fewer,
leading to the classic replicator equation [28] describing the evolution of pi, the proportion of
agents attending to factor i:
ρ˙i = ρi
E(Ri)− n∑
j=1
ρjE(Rj)
 , (6)
where
∑n
i=1 ρi = 1 by definition. When solving these n equations (one for each factor) numer-
ically, we normalise the total rewards given to all agents such that
∑n
i=1 ρiE(Ri) = 1. This is
equivalent to adaptive variation of the time step and does not change the relative rewards be-
tween options, nor the final steady state, but ensures smoother convergence to that state. This
also mimics a real constraint on any practical reward system where the total reward available
may be fixed. In our simulation of the collective dynamics of the system we used the Runge-
Kutta order 2(3) algorithm, as implemented in R by Soetaert et al. [34].
The three reward schemes
In the main text we present three possible systems for rewarding agents for making accurate
predictions. Each reward scheme corresponds to a choice of reward modulation function, f(z),
which determines the magnitude of the reward when an agent makes an accurate prediction, as
a function of the proportion, z, of other agents that also do so. These are:
1. Binary rewards: f(z) = 1
2. Market rewards: f(z) = 1/z
3. Minority rewards: f(z) = 1−H(z − 1/2), where H is the Heavyside step-function.
The expected reward an agent receives for attending to factor i is therefore the expected value
of f(zi), conditional on their vote being accurate:
E(Ri) =
∫ 1

f(zi)P (Y = xi | zi)p(zi)dz. (7)
where zi is the proportion of agents voting identically to those attending to factor i: zi =∑n
j=1 ρjδxi,xj , where δ is the Kronecker delta. The lower limit of the integral above is  > 0 to
account for the limiting case of a single individual attending to the factor. As the population
size N tends to infinity,  tends to zero. For our implementation we take  = 10−6.
Normal approximation for expected rewards
In our model individuals are rewarded for making correct predictions. Rewards vary according
to how many other individuals are correct. Focusing on a single individual who attends to factor
i, we can calculate the expected reward received by the individual as follows. Firstly, we assume
without loss of generality by symmetry that the focal individual observes xi = 1. We denote as
zi the proportion of individuals who vote the same way as the focal individual, and allow for a
6
general reward modulation function f(z). With these conditions, the expected reward, E(Ri)
is:
E(Ri) =
∫ 1
0
f(zi)P (ψ > 0 | xi = 1, zi)p(zi)dz (8)
For a relatively small number of independent factors, n (we use n < 10) this integral can be
evaluated by exhaustive enumeration of all possible values of x1, . . . , xn, and thus all possible
values of ψ and zi. Otherwise, assuming n to be large, we use normal approximations to the
relevant probabilities in this integral.
Given the independence of the individual values of xi, the mean and variance of ψ can be
determined by the linearity of expectations and by the sum rule for variances of independent
variables:
E(ψ | xi = 1) = βi
n∑
j 6=i
βjE(xj) = βi
var(ψ | xi = 1) =
n∑
j 6=i
β2jE(x2j ) =
n∑
j¬i
β2j
⇒ p(ψ | xi = 1) ' N
ψ;βi,∑
j 6=i
β2j

(9)
In the case of binary rewards, where f(z) = 1, the value of zi does not impact on the reward
for attending to any factor. In this case the expected reward is calculated directly from the
distribution of ψ:
Ebinary(Ri) = P (ψ > 0 | xi = 1)
=
∫ ∞
0
N
ψ;βi,∑
j 6=i
β2j
 dψ
= Φ
(
βi∑
j 6=i β
2
j
) (10)
For other reward schemes where the value of z affects the reward, we also require an ap-
proximation for p(zi). Again we calculate the mean and variance of zi:
E(zi | xi = 1) = ρi +
∑
j 6=i
ρj(E(xj) + 1)/2 = (1 + ρi)/2
var(zi | xi = 1) =
n∑
j 6=i
(ρj/2)
2E(x2j ) =
1
4
∑
j 6=i
ρ2j
⇒ p(zi | xi = 1) ' N
z; 1 + ρi
2
,
1
4
∑
j 6=i
ρ2j

(11)
The convergence of zi in distribution to a normal distribution depends on the values of {ρ}
meeting the Lindeberg condition [33]. In practice this means that all elements of {ρ} should
tend to zero as the number of dimensions, n tends to infinity, i.e. the distribution should not
be dominated by a small subset of elements. As illustrated in Figure 1, when the system is
initialised in a state conforming to these requirements it will remain so for market and minority
reward systems, but not for the binary reward system. Since the binary reward system does
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not depend on the value of zi the failure of this approximation in this case does not have any
repurcussions for our results.
ψ and zi are correlated due to the shared dependence on the values of x1, . . . , xn, with a
covariance of:
cov(zi, ψ | xi = 1) = 1
2
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
βjρkE(xjxk)
=
1
2
∑
j 6=i
βjρj
(12)
In the normal distribution limit,the joint distribution may be approximated as
p(ψ, zi | xi = 1) = N
([
ψ
zi
]
;
[
µψ
µz
]
,
[
Kψ,ψ Kψ,z
Kψ,z Kz,z
])
(13)
with,
µψ = E(ψ | xi = 1)
µz = E(zi | xi = 1)
Kψ,ψ = var(ψ | xi = 1)
Kz,z = var(zi | xi = 1)
Kψ, z = cov(ψ, zi | xi = 1)
Using standard relations for conditional normal distributions we therefore have:
p(ψ | xi = 1, zi) = N
(
ψ;µψ + (zi − µz)Kψ,x
Kz,z
,Kψ,ψ −
K2ψ,x
Kz,z
)
⇒ P (ψ > 0 | xi = 1, z) = Φ
µψ + (zi − µz)Kψ,xKz,z
Kψ,ψ − K
2
ψ,x
Kz,z
 (14)
Combining the above expressions gives the complete equation for the expected reward of at-
tending to factor i, conditioned on the values of β, the current distribution of attention, ρ, and
the reward function f(z)
E(Ri) =
∫ 1

f(zi)N (zi;µz,Kz,z) Φ
µψ + (zi − µz)Kψ,xKz,z
Kψ,ψ − K
2
ψ,x
Kz,z
 dzi (15)
This integral may be evaluated numerically to give the expected reward for any general reward
modulation function f(z).
Calculating collective accuracy
The collective accuracy, C, is the probability that the collective vote will correctly predict the
ground truth, conditioned on the current distribution of attention to different factors. For small
numbers of factors (we use n < 10) this can be determined exactly by exhaustive search over all
2n possible combinations of the values of x1, . . . xn. For larger values of n we use the following
normal approximation (similarly defined as above) for the joint distribution of the latent ground
truth function ψ and the collective vote V .
p(ψ, V ) ' N
([
ψ
V
]
;
[
0
0
]
,
[
Sψ,ψ Sψ,V
Sψ,V SV,V
])
(16)
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where
Sψ,ψ =
n∑
i=1
β2i , SV,V =
1
4
n∑
i=1
ρ2i , Sψ,V =
1
2
n∑
i=1
βiρi, (17)
implying the following conditional probability distribution for V given ψ:
p(V | ψ) ' N
(
V ;ψ
Sψ,V
Sψ,ψ
, SV,V −
S2ψ,V
Sψ,ψ
)
. (18)
Considering without loss of generality the case where Y = 1,
C = P (Yˆ = 1 | Y = 1)
= P (V > 0 | ψ > 0)
= 2
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
N
(
V ;ψ
Sψ,V
Sψ,ψ
, SV,V −
S2ψ,V
Sψ,ψ
)
dVN (ψ; 0, Sψ,ψ) dψ
= 2
∫ ∞
0
Φ
 ψ Sψ,VSψ,ψ
SV,V − S
2
ψ,V
Sψ,ψ
 dVN (ψ; 0, Sψ,ψ) dψ,
(19)
which can be evaluated numerically. By maximising the above expression with respect to the
distribution of ρ, one can show the intuitive result that collective accuracy is maximised when
ρ ∝ β, at which point collective accuracy is 100%. The normal approximation limit becomes
invalid when the distribution of {ρ} is concentrated on very few elements; in these cases (which
we identify as 99% of the distribution mass being concretrated on fewer than 10 elements) we
use exhaustive search over the values of {x} corresponding to the remaining factors with a
non-negligible values of ρ.
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Figure 1: Evolution of collective accuracy (a,c,e) and diversity (b, d, f) for binary rewards (black
line), market rewards (blue line) and minority rewards (red line) in simulations with n = 100
(a,b), n = 1000 (c,d) and n = 10, 000 (e,f) independent factors. Solid lines indicate results from
a uniform initial allocation of agents over factors, while dashed lines indicate an initial allocation
of 50% of agents to the single most important factor, with the remainder allocated uniformly
over the remaining factors. Note that the number of time steps is plotted on a logarithmic scale
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Figure 2: Collective accuracy at equilibrium as a function of the number of indepen-
dent factors across different reward systems. Solid lines and shaded regions show
the mean and standard deviation from 10 independent simulations with different
randomly generated values for the factor coefficients. Points on each curve show
the precise values of n for which simulations were carried out, equally spaced within
each multiple of 10.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium proportions of agents paying attention to each factor, as
a function of the coefficient associated with that factor. Results are shown for
simulations with n = 10000 factors, and for the three reward systems of binary
rewards (a), market rewards (b) and minority rewards (c), as well as the uniform
allocation (d). Binary rewards drive almost all agents to the single most important
factor (the greatest coefficient). Market rewards create a distribution proportional
to coefficient size across the most important 10% of factors, while minority rewards
distribute agents almost perfectly in proportion to the magnitude of the coefficient.14
Supplementary Information
Mathematical analysis of stability of stationary states
Stationary solution for the binary rewards scheme
Under binary rewards agents receive a fixed reward for voting correctly. Under these conditions
the stationary and stable distribution is one with all agents attending to a single factor, the
one with the greatest value of β. The expected reward for agents in this system is simply
proportional to the probability of voting correctly. If we set the fixed reward to be 1, and
assuming without loss of generality that a focal agent observes factor xi = 1 this can be written
as:
E(Ri) = P (ψ > 0 | xi = 1)
= P (βi +
∑
j 6=i
βjxj > 0). (20)
Since
∑
j 6=i βjxj has an expectation of zero and a variance that decreases with increasing βi
the above expression is clearly a monotonically increasing function of βi. Agents that observe
factors other than that with the highest value of β can always improve their expected reward
by moving to the factor with the highest value of β. As such the distribution with all agents
attending to this factor is both stationary and stable.
Stationary solution for the minority rewards scheme
The ideal distribution froma standpoint of collective accuracy is: ρi = βi, recalling that we
normalise the values of {β} such that ∑nk=1 βk = 1. This distribution is intrinsically stationary
under the minority rewards system. If ρi = βi then the collective vote is always accurate,
implying that P (ψ > 0 | xi, zi) = 0 ∀zi < 0.5, which implies that no reward is possible for
zi < 0.5. At the same time the reward structure implies that no reward is possible for zi > 0.5,
so the reward for attending to any factor is zero. Therefore there is no evolutionary pressure
for agents to change the factor that they attend to.
Stability of the ideal distribution for the minority rewards scheme
We analyse the stability of the stationary ideal distribution by considering the evolution of small
perturbations away from this stationary state. The expected reward as a function of {ρ} is non-
differentiable at the stationary point, so we cannot perform standard linear stability analysis
for arbitrary pertubations. Instead we consider two special types of perturbation: (i) a small
transfer of agent desnsity from one factor, j to another, i, leaving all other factors unchanged,
and (ii) an extensive perturbation over all factors, such that the distribution of perturbations
over factors obeys the Lindeberg condition [33] and thus permits limiting approximations in-
volving the normal distribution.
Pertubation on two factors. First we consider a pertubation of the form:
ρi = βi + ∆, ∆ > 0
ρj = βj −∆
ρk = βk, ∀k 6= i, j
(21)
In the case of such a pertubation we need to consider the rewards received by agents attending
to each factor under four scenarios, based on the values of xi and xj : (i) xi = xj = 1; (ii)
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xi = xj = −1; (iii) xi = 1, xj = −1; (iv) xi = −1, xj = 1. Each of these scenarios occurs with
probability 1/4. We will address each in turn, considering the expected reward for attending to
factor i, factor j and a general factor l, l 6= i, j.
Scenario 1, xi = 1, xj = 1: The value of ψ:
(ψ | xi = 1, xj = 1) = βi + βj +
∑
k 6=i,j
βkxk
⇒ P (ψ | xi = 1, xj = 1) ' N (ψ;βi + βj , σB), σB =
n∑
i=1
β2i
(22)
The expected reward for factor i conditioned on xi = 1, xj = 1:
(zi | xi = 1, xj = 1) = βi + βj + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j
βk(1 + xk)
=
1
2
(1 + βi + βj +
∑
k 6=i,j
βkxk)
=
1
2
(1 + ψ)
⇒ E(Ri | xi = 1, xj = 1) = P (ψ > 0, ψ < 0) = 0
(23)
The expected reward for factor j conditioned on xi = 1, xj = 1:
(zj | (xi = 1, xj = 1) = βi + βj + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j
βk(1 + xk)
=
1
2
(1 + ψ)
⇒ E(Rj | xi = 1, xj = 1) = P (ψ > 0, ψ < 0) = 0
(24)
The expected reward for factor i conditioned on xi = 1, xj = 1. In considering factor l we must
separately consider the two cases where xl = 1 and xl = −1:
(zl | xi = 1, xj = 1, xl = 1) = βi + βj + βl + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j,l
βk(1 + xk)
=
1
2
(1 + ψ)
⇒ E(Rl | xi = 1, xj = 1, xl = 1) = P (ψ > 0, ψ < 0) = 0
(zl | xi = 1, xj = 1, xl = −1) = βl + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j,l
βk(1− xk)
=
1
2
(1− ψ + 2βl)
⇒ E(Rl | xi = 1, xj = 1, xl = −1) = P (ψ < 0, ψ − 2βl > 0) = 0
∴ E(Rl | xi = 1, xj = 1) = 0
(25)
In summary:
E(Ri | xi = 1, xj = 1) = 0
E(Rj | xi = 1, xj = 1) = 0
E(Rl | xi = 1, xj = 1) = 0
(26)
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Scenario 2, xi = −1, xj = −1, following the same procedure: The value of ψ:
(ψ | xi = −1, xj = −1) = −βi − βj +
∑
k 6=i,j
βkxk
⇒ P (ψ | xi = −1, xj = −1) ' N (ψ;−βi − βj , σB), σB =
n∑
i=1
β2i
(27)
The expected reward for factor i conditioned on xi = −1, xj = −1:
(zi|xi = −1, xj = −1) = βi + βj + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j
βk(1− xk)
=
1
2
(1 + βi + βj −
∑
k 6=i,j
βkxk)
=
1
2
(1− ψ)
⇒ E(Ri | xi = −1, xj = −1) = P (ψ < 0, ψ > 0) = 0
(28)
The expected reward for factor j conditioned on xi = −1, xj = −1:
(zj | xi = −1, xj = −1) = βi + βj + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j
βk(1− xk)
=
1
2
(1− ψ)
⇒ E(Rj | xi = −1, xj = −1) = P (ψ < 0, ψ > 0) = 0
(29)
The expected reward for factor l conditioned on xi = −1, xj = −1:
(zl | xi = −1, xj = −1, xl = 1) = βl + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j,l
βk(1 + xk)
=
1
2
(1 + ψ)
⇒ E(Rl | xi = −1, xj = −1, xl = −1) = P (ψ > 0, ψ < 0) = 0
(zl | xi = −1, xj = −1, xl = −1) = βi + βj + βl + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j,l
βk(1− xk)
=
1
2
(1− ψ + 2βl)
⇒ E(Rl | xi = −1, xj = −1, xl = −1) = P (ψ < 0, ψ − 2βl > 0) = 0
∴ E(Rl | xi = −1, xj = −1) = 0
(30)
In summary:
E(Ri | xi = −1, xj = −1) = 0
E(Rj | xi = −1, xj = −1) = 0
E(Rl | xi = −1, xj = −1) = 0
(31)
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Scenario 3, xi = 1, xj = −1, following the same procedure: The value of ψ:
(ψ | xi = 1, xj = −1) = βi − βj +
∑
k 6=i,j
βkxk
⇒ P (ψ | xi = 1, xj = −1) ' N (ψ;βi − βj , σB), σB =
n∑
i=1
β2i
(32)
The expected reward for factor i conditioned on xi = 1, xj = −1:
(zi|xi = 1, xj = −1) = βi + ∆ + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j
βk(1 + xk)
=
1
2
(1 + βi − βj + 2∆ +
∑
k 6=i,j
βkxk)
=
1
2
(1 + ψ + 2∆)⇒ E(Ri | xi = 1, xj = −1) = P (ψ > 0, ψ + 2∆ < 0) = 0
(33)
The expected reward for factor j conditioned on xi = 1, xj = −1:
(zj | xi = 1, xj = −1) = βj −∆ + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j
βk(1− xk)
=
1
2
(1− ψ − 2∆)
⇒ E(Rj | xi = 1, xj = −1) = P (ψ < 0, ψ + 2∆ > 0) ' 2N (βi − βj , 0, σB)∆
(34)
The expected reward for factor l conditioned on xi = 1, xj = −1:
(zl | xi = 1, xj = −1, xl = 1) = βi + ∆ + βl + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j,l
βk(1 + xk)
=
1
2
(1 + ψ + 2∆)
⇒ E(Rl | xi = 1, xj = −1, xl = 1) = P (ψ > 0, ψ + 2∆ < 0) = 0
(zl | xi = −1, xj = 1, xl = −1) = βj −∆ + βl + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j,l
βk(1− xk)
=
1
2
(1− ψ − 2βl)
⇒ E(Rl | xi = 1, xj = −1, xl = −1) = P (ψ < 0, ψ + 2βl > 0) ' 2N (βi − βj + βl, 0, σB)∆
∴ E(Rl | xi = 1, xj = −1) ' N (βi − βj + βl, 0, σB)∆
(35)
In summary:
E(Ri | xi = 1, xj = −1) = 0
E(Rj | xi = 1, xj = −1) ' 2∆N (βi − βj , 0, σB)
E(Rl | xi = 1, xj = −1) ' ∆N (βi − βj + βl, 0, σB)
(36)
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Scenario 4, xi = −1, xj = 1, following the same procedure: The value of ψ:
(ψ | xi = −1, xj = 1) = −βi + βj +
∑
k 6=i,j
βkxk
⇒ P (ψ | xi = −1, xj = 1) ' N (ψ;−βi + βj , σB), σB =
n∑
i=1
β2i
(37)
The expected reward for factor i conditioned on xi = −1, xj = 1:
(zi|xi = −1, xj = 1) = βi + ∆ + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j
βk(1− xk)
=
1
2
(1 + βi − βj + 2∆−
∑
k 6=i,j
βkxk)
=
1
2
(1− ψ + 2∆)⇒ E(Ri | xi = −1, xj = 1) = P (ψ < 0, ψ − 2∆ > 0) = 0
(38)
The expected reward for factor j conditioned on xi = −1, xj = 1:
(zj | xi = −1, xj = 1) = βj −∆ + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j
βk(1 + xk)
=
1
2
(1 + ψ − 2∆)
⇒ E(Rj | xi = −1, xj = 1) = P (ψ > 0, ψ − 2∆ < 0) ' 2N (βi − βj , 0, σB)∆
(39)
The expected reward for factor l conditioned on xi = −1, xj = 1:
(zl | xi = −1, xj = 1, xl = 1) = βj −∆βl + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j,l
βk(1 + xk)
=
1
2
(1 + ψ − 2∆)
⇒ E(Rl | xi = −1, xj = 1, xl = 1) = P (ψ > 0, ψ − 2∆ < 0) ' 2N (βi − βj − βl, 0, σB)∆
(zl | xi = −1, xj = 1, xl = −1) = βi + ∆ + βl + 1
2
∑
k 6=i,j,l
βk(1− xk)
=
1
2
(1− ψ + 2βl)
⇒ E(Rl | xi = −1, xj = 1, xl = −1) = P (ψ < 0, ψ − 2βl > 0) = 0
∴ E(Rl | xi = −1, xj = 1) ' N (βi − βj − βl, 0, σB)∆
(40)
In summary:
E(Ri | xi = −1, xj = 1) = 0
E(Rj | xi = −1, xj = 1) ' 2N (βi − βj , 0, σB)∆
E(Rl | xi = −1, xj = 1) ' N (βi − βj − βl, 0, σB)∆
(41)
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Adding all four scenarios together weighted by the probability p = 1/4 of each, we therefore
have overall
E(Ri) = 0
E(Rj) ' N (βi − βj , 0, σB)∆
E(Rl) ' 1
4
N (βi − βj + βl, 0, σB)∆ + 1
4
N (βi − βj − βl, 0, σB)∆
' 1
2
N (βi − βj , 0, σB)∆, based on Taylor expansion for small βl
(42)
If we substitute these quantities into the replicator equation we obtain:
ρ˙i = ∆˙ ' −1
2
N (βi − βj , 0, σB)∆
ρ˙j = −∆˙ ' 1
2
N (βi − βj , 0, σB)∆
ρ˙l = 0
(43)
Hence the initial perturbation will move back towards zero on both factors i and j without
causing additional perturbations on the other factors, with the rate of convergence depending
on the difference between βi and βj
Perturbation on many factors. Now we consider an extensive pertubation to the ideal
distribution, such that ρi = βi + ∆i. Specifically we assume that the values of {∆} are suffi-
ciently well spread across factors that the quantity
∑n
k=1 ∆kxk obeys the Lindeberg condition
[33] and thus can be approximated as converging to a normal distribution for large n. Consid-
ering the case where the focal player observes xi = 1 without loss of generality, this implies that
the expected reward for attending to factor i can be written as:
E(Ri) = P (ψ > 0, zi < 1/2|xi = 1) (44)
Define u ≡ 2zi − 1 = ψ + ∆i +
∑
j 6=i ∆jxj), such that the condition above becomes:
E(Ri) = P (ψ > 0, ui < 0|xi = 1)
=
∫ 0
−∞
∫ ∞
0
p(ui | ψ)p(ψ | xi = 1)dψdu
(45)
In the limit of large n we have the following limiting normal distributions:
P (ψ|xi = 1) = N (ψ;βi, σB), σ2B =
n∑
j=1
β2j
P (ui|ψ) = N (ui;ψ + ∆i, σ∆), σ2∆ =
n∑
j=1
∆2j
(46)
In order to facilitate taking the limit as the perturbations {∆} tend to zero, define ∆i = kδi
and σ2δ =
∑n
j=1 δ
2
i = k
2σ2∆, where δi characterises the relative sizes of the perturbations on each
factor and k an overall scale of perturbation. With these definitions we can write the expected
reward as:
E(Ri) =
∫ ∞
0
N (ψ;βi, σB)
∫ 0
−∞
N (u;ψ + kδi, kσδ)dudψ (47)
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Making a change of variables of w = −(ψ+kδi)kσδ , dropping terms of order k
2 and replacing one
integral by the cumulative normal function in equation 47 we get:
E(Ri) ' kσδN (βi; 0, σB)
∫ −δi/σδ
−∞
Φ(w)dw
= kN (βi; 0, σB)
(
−δiΦ(−δi
σδ
) + σδN (−δi
σδ
; 0, 1)
) (48)
We are now in a position to recognise that,since the values of {∆} obey the Lindeberg conditon
[33] by prrior assumption, as n → ∞, −δiσδ → 0 and
βi
σB
→ 0, which implies Φ(−δiσδ ) ' 12 ,
N (−δiσδ ; 0, 1) ' 1√2pi and N (βi; 0, σB) '
1
σB
√
2pi
. Substituting back in ∆i = kδi and σ∆ = kσδ the
above then simplifies to
E(Ri) ' 1√
2pi
(
−∆i
2
+
σ∆√
2pi
)
(49)
The evolution of the density of individuals attending to each factor is determined by the relative
expected rewards for that factor compared to the average expected reward across all factors,
implying the following evolutionary equations for the perturbation after dropping second order
terms:
ρ˙i = ρi
E(Ri)− n∑
j=1
ρjE(Rj)

⇒ ∆˙i = βi
2
√
2piσB
−∆i + n∑
j=1
βj∆j
 (50)
This equation shows that the ideal distribution is generally stable to perturbations, though not
absolutely so in the first order. If the perturbation values {∆} are independent the values of
{β}, the final term ∑nj=1 βj∆j tned to zero as n tends to infinity. However, if the perturbation
is dependent on {β}, this second term could cause the perturbation on some factors to grow
for a short time. Once the perturbation has grown sufficiently, the first term will bring it back
towards the stationary state.
Our analysis has been unable to fully treat pertubations on many factors where these do
not satisfy the Lindeberg condition [33] to permit treatment by normal distribution approxima-
tions. However, the convergence of our simulations to a stationary equilibrium close the ideal
distribution of ρi = βi from multiple starting conditions suggests that this stationary point is
stable for practical purposes.
Correlated factors
So far we have considered the values of x1, . . . , xn to be uncorrelated and independent of one
another. However, in real world examples this assumption will frequently be violated, either
because there are observable information sources that display intrinsic correlations (consider
the various news sources with either a left-leaning or right-leaning political bias), or because
individuals may attend to composite sources: an individual may attend to multiple different in-
formation sources and create their own composite factor through some combination of these. To
illustrate, an individual who reads multiple news sources may vote based on their own weighted
average of the opinions expressed in these. News aggregation services, or professional analysts
may produce similar composite factors that individuals can choose to attend to, similarly to the
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way in which one may invest in a mutual fund with a manager who picks investments for the
fund as a whole.
We can show that under the minority reward system, the ideal distribution of ρi ∝ βi remains
stationary and stable if we allow values of x1, . . . , xn to exhibit correlations. The intrisinsic
stationarity of the ideal distribution remains, since under this distribution the collective vote is
always correct, implying that the probability to receive any reward is zero independent of which
factor an individual attends to. To assess the stability of this distribution we proceed from
modified versions of the expressions in equation 46, accounting the the correlations between
values of x1, . . . , xn. Defining qij =< xixj > to be the covariance between factors i and j, we
have the following limiting normal distributions:
p(ψ|xi = 1) = N (ψ;βi, σ′B), σ′2B =
n∑
j=1
n∑
l=1
βjβlqjl
p(u|ψ, xi = 1) = N (ui;ψ + ∆i, σ′∆), σ′2∆ =
n∑
j=1
n∑
l=1
∆j∆lqjl
(51)
From this point we can repeat the analysis from equation 47 to equation 50, taking the limit as
the perturbation size tends to zero and as n tends to infinity as before. Taking these limits will
be valid when the effective number of independent factors tends to infinity in line with n, such
that −δi
σ′δ
→ 0 and βi
σ′B
→ 0 as n → ∞, but not otherwise. To illustrate by a simple example:
if qij = 1∀i, j then there is effectively only one independent factor, and the arguments made
for the limiting behaviour as n → ∞ will clearly not hold. The ideal distribution will display
the same stability for cases with correlated factors as for those with uncorrelated factors as the
determinant of the covariance matrix q tends to infinity, i.e. when the aggregate correlation
between factors grows more slowly than the number of factors.
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